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The Testamentary Life Insurance Trust
I. INTRODUCTION
In a testamentary life insurance trust proceeds of a life in-
surance contract are paid to trustees named in the will of the
insured. The trustees hold or dispose of the proceeds as the
terms of the will dictate. The distinctive characteristic of the
trust is its dependence upon the vll of the insured for com-
pletion; in contrast, the inter vivos life insurance trust is cre-
ated before the insured's death. The dependence of the testa-
mentary trust upon the will raises the problem of whether the
disposition violates the Statute of Wills since the statutory for-
malities are not followed. Further, when the policies are assigned
to trustees to be named in the last will, no trustees exist until
the insured's last will is legally established raising the question
whether a valid trust has been created. Consequently, validity
of such a trust is uncertain.1
The testamentary life insurance trust combines the in-
dividual advantages of the life insurance contract, the inter
vivos trust, and the inter vivos trust with a pour-over from the
will of the settlor.2  One of the chief advantages of life in-
surance is to provide the estate with necessary liquidity. By
having the proceeds made payable to someone other than the
executor, the expense and delay of probate can be avoided.
Further, when probate is avoided, the claims of creditors can-
not be satisfied out of the insurance proceeds.
By placing the proceeds in trust, the insured can provide
effective management and control of the funds for the bene-
ficiaries. The trust provides flexibility as the trustee can be
given discretionary power to withhold or distribute proceeds as
circumstances warrant.
The testamentary insurance trust may be preferred to an
inter vivos trust since the insured need not undertake the
trouble and expense of erecting a -trust when the insurance is
1. See generally Cooper, Testamentary Trust for Insurance?, 97
TRUSTS & ESTATES 113 (1958) (Pennsylvania law); Lawthers, Designating
Trustee Under Will as Beneficiary of Insurance-Home-Office Problems,
94 TRUSTS & ESTATES 826 (1955); Schipper, Designating Trustee Under
Will as Beneficiary of Insurance-Legal Problems, 94 TRUSTS & ESTATES
819 (1955).
2. The pour-over is a provision in the will adding estate property
to an inter vivos trust. Such a device has been increasingly allowed by
statute. E.g., MiNN. STAT. § 525.223 (Supp. 1966); Wis. STAT. § 231.205
(1957).
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purchased. Moreover, the denomination of a trustee may be
deferred. Since the insurance proceeds will be administered as
part of a trust set up under the will for the probate assets, the
testamentary trust provides for a unified estate plan. This same
unification can be achieved by establishing an inter vivos trust
with the insurance proceeds payable to such trust and a pour-
over of the assets of the estate passing under the will.3 However,
the testamentary insurance trust is a much less complicated
vehicle,4 with none of the disadvantages of establishing an inter
vivos trust. An inter vivos insurance trust may be financially
impractical if the insured is of small means and the insurance
proceeds are relatively small. In addition, the testamentary
trust will allow greater flexibility should the insured wish to put
the proceeds of the policies in trust only under certain circum-
stances. For example, a trust may be deemed unnecessary if the
beneficiaries have attained a certain age at insured's death. In
such a case the will could designate a trustee as beneficiary of
the proceeds or, in the alternative, the named beneficiaries if
they have attained the specified age.
The unique advantages of the testamentary life insurance
trust being readily apparent, this Note will consider the validity
of such a trust in the light of judicial precedent. A comparison
will be made with the treatment afforded the simple life insur-
ance contract and the inter vivos life insurance trust. It will
be argued that the favorable judicial treatment shown the latter
methods of circumventing probate should be extended to the
testamentary insurance trust, notwithstanding its dependence
upon the will. Also to be considered are the implications of
such a trust as regards the spouse's forced share and the
rights of creditors.
II. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE TESTAMENTARY
LIFE INSURANCE TRUST
Although the case authority directly in point is limited, the
authority which is available reveals a conflict of opinion con-
cerning the validity of the testamentary life insurance trust on
3. See Note, 44 MNm. L. REv. 131 (1959).
4. See Schipper, supra note 1. In reference to a pour-over from
the will into an inter vivos insurance trust, Schipper states:
To the insured all of this may seem complicated and unneces-
sary, particularly if he is a man of small means and the insur-
ance in question is only a moderate amount. The obvious
question he will ask is why his life insurance cannot be made
payable directly to the trustees under his will.
Id. at 819.
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both will and trust grounds. In Frost v. Frost,5 insured assigned
all his rights, title, and interest in certain life insurance policies
to a "trustee to be named in my w.ll"6 for the use of his wife.
The insured subsequently executed several wills, each of which
provided for a different trustee of the insurance policies. In
holding the trust invalid, the court proceeded on two grounds:
(1) the assignments were of a testamentary nature and could
not be operative after insured's death without the formalities
required by the Statute of Wills; and (2) since the assignments
could not take effect during insured's life without a trustee,
there was nothing upon which to base the alleged trust. The
Frost court emphasized that the language of the assignments
pointed to a testamentary intention. Since different trustees
were named in the several wills following the execution of the
trust, the court concluded that the trustee could not be finally
ascertained until after the death of insured.
Tootle-Lacy Nat'l Bank v. Rollier7 is contrary to the Frost
case. Policies with one company were payable to a bank as
trustee if the insured died testate with a trust operating under
the will and his wife survived him; otherwise, the proceeds
were payable to his executors or administrators. Policies with
another company were payable to the trustees named in the
will of the insured if his wife survived and insured left a will;
otherwise, the proceeds were payable to his executor or ad-
ministrators. In upholding the trust in both variations, the court
relied on the clear intent of the insureds that the proceeds of
these policies pass according to the trust in his will, but not as a
part of his estate.9 The court maintained that if the insured
had intended otherwise, he would have made the proceeds pay-
able directly to his representatives or his estate. No distinction
was made between the policies of the two companies-one
5. 202 Mass. 100, 88 N.E. 446 (1909).
6. The designation of "trustee to be named in my will" raised the
question of the will to which the insured was referring. The court held
the designation to mean the trustees in the document finally admitted
to probate as the will of the insured.
7. 341 Mo. 1029, 111 S.W.2d 12 (1937).
8. See United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 133 F.2d
886 (8th Cir. 1943). The insured made the bank beneficiary of four
life insurance policies "as trustee, under the last Will and Testament
of the insured." However, the insured made no specific reference to
the policies in his will, but left a residuary estate in trust for his wife
and daughter. The court upheld the trust, resting its decision on the
intention of insured.
9. Contra, United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 133 F.2d
886, 888 (8th Cir. 1943) (dissenting opinion).
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naming a trustee, the other providing for the naming of a trustee
in insured's will. The failure to make this distinction follows
logically from the court's emphasis on the intention of the in-
sured: the policies "differ in form and wording, though not in
intent .... 10
Unfortunately, the Rollier case, although conflicting with
the Frost decision, does not meet the two contentions of Frost
that the trust is testamentary and that no present trust is cre-
ated. Thus, an analysis of the Frost objections is needed for a
thorough understanding of the problem.
A. THE TESTAxmNTARY OBJECTION
In examining the testamentary objection, it is helpful to con-
sider the treatment accorded life insurance contracts in general,
and the inter vivos life insurance trust. Conceptually, a life in-
surance policy is by its very nature testamentary. The in-
sured contracts to pay premiums in return for an agreement by
the insurer to pay a designated sum to a specified beneficiary
on the insured's death. Since the insured may reserve the
power to change the beneficiary or revoke the policy altogether,
the insured has complete dominion and control over the policy
until death. Nevertheless, the formalities which generally ac-
company a testamentary disposition are not required for the in-
surance policy. 12 Some courts distinguish the life insurance con-
tract from the will on the basis that life insurance does not
operate on property owned by the insured at his death,13 and
thus cannot be a part of his estate. Life insurance policies are
also distinguished from wills on the rationale that the former
are contracts between insured and insurer for payment of a
stipulated sum upon the inevitable contingency of death.14
10. 341 Mo. 1029, 1035, 111 S.W.2d 12, 15 (1937).
11. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Glenn, 39 F. Supp. 822 (W.D.
Ky. 1941) (dictum). The court in Sigal v. Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 119 Conn. 570, 177 Atl. 743 (1935), suggests that the life insurance
contract "somewhat resembles" a will because of the condition of pay-
ment on death and the ambulatory nature of the life insurance policy
where the right to change the beneficiary is reserved.
12. Sigal v. Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 119 Conn. 570, 177
Atl. 743 (1935) (dictum); Martin v. Modern Woodsmen of America, 253
Ill. 400, 97 N.E. 693 (1912); In re Haedrich's Estate, 134 Misc. 741, 236
N.Y.S. 395 (1929) (dictum).
13. Sigal v. Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 119 Conn. 570, 177
Atl. 743 (1935); Bullen v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 177 Md. 271, 9 A.2d
581 (1939); In re Koss' Estate, 106 N.J. Eq. 323, 150 Atl. 360 (1930);
In re Voorhees' Estate, 200 App. Div. 259, 193 N.Y.S. 168 (1922).
14. See, e.g., Gurnett v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 356 Ill. 612, 191 N.E.
19671 1121
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Whatever the reasoning, life insurance contracts generally are
held to be nontestamentary. 15 Thus, the life insurance pro-
ceeds do not pass through the estate and are not subject to the
expenses of probate, the spouse's forced share, and the claims of
creditors.
The inter vivos life insurance trust has also been challenged
as testamentary. The trust is created by designating a named
trustee as beneficiary in the insurance contract and by at-
taching a trust agreement providing for the disposition of the
insurance proceeds by the trustee. The insurance contract usu-
ally provides for an extensive reservation of rights to the settlor-
insured beyond the traditional right of changing the beneficiary.
The inclusion of these provisions has been the basis for the con-
tention that the insurance trust is not a present disposition of
property, but a mere cover for a testamentary disposition. For
example, in Gurnett v. Mututal Life Ins. Co.,16 the insured re-
served the right to change the beneficiary, borrow money on the
policies, use them as security, receive dividends from the poli-
cies, and surrender any policy for its cash value. He further
reserved the right to terminate, modify, or amend the agreement.
The court held the insurance trust valid, even against the claims
of insured's creditors.17 The rationale was that since an ordi-
nary life insurance policy is not testamentary, and since the re-
cipient of an inter vivos life insurance trust is also a third-party
beneficiary of a contract, a life insurance contract payable to a
trustee should not be found testamentary. 8
The potential problem of the trustee-beneficiary taldng a
divided interest is a matter of trust law, not bearing on the testa-
250 (1934); In re Soper's Estate, 196 .[inn. 60, 264 N.W. 427 (1935);
Bickers v. Shenandoah Valley Nat'l Bank, 197 Va. 145, 88 S.E.2d 889
(1955).
15. See generally ATmaNsoN, WiLms §§ 39, 40, 44 (2d ed. 1953);
VANCE, INSURANCE § 108 (3d ed. 1951); Gulliver & Tilson, Classification
of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1 (1941). In Fallon, Contract and
Life Insurance, 59 Dicx. L. REV. 40 (1954), the writer argues:
"Testamentary disposition" is a symbol that the cases use. All
symbols carry an overcharge. The overcharge of "testamentary
disposition" is the connotation that all dispositions of personal
property are invalid which do not meet the special form that
the Statute of Wills fixes. . . . The symbol of "testamentary
disposition" never had a place in the field of life insurance.
Life insurance rests in the field of contract.
Id. at 42.
16. 356 Ill. 612, 191 N.E. 250 (1934).
17. See Gordon v. Portland Trust Bank, 201 Ore. 648, 271 P.2d 653
(1954) (trust valid against spouse's forced share).
18. See Bose v. Meury, 112 N.J. Eq. 62, 163 Atl. 276 (1932).
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rnentary question." Further, there is no reason to distinguish
between rights reserved in the insurance trust and those re-
served in the insurance contract since the extent of control is
virtually the same.2 0 Thus the courts have had little difficulty in
upholding inter vivos life insurance trusts in spite of several
testamentary characteristics. 2 1
Unfortunately, the willingness of the courts to uphold the
life insurance contract and the inter vivos life insurance trust
against testamentary attack has not been extended to the testa-
mentary life insurance trust.22 Admittedly, the latter is differ-
ent in that it depends on the will of insured to complete the trust,
but this factor is of no real consequence. Both inter vivos and
testamentary insurance trusts are skeletal until the death of in-
sured.23 In both, the ultimate trustee-beneficiary is uncertain
until the insured dies. Although in the inter vivos trust the
trustee is currently designated, the insured may amend or re-
voke the trust, thus changing the trustee. Further, whether the
trust is inter vivos or testamentary, the proceeds of the insurance
will not be received by the beneficiary until the death of the
insured. The peculiar testamentary nature of life insurance
should be recognized in the testamentary life insurance trust
situation. The conceptual distinctions between the life insurance
contract and the will are equally applicable where the life
insurance is in a testamentary trust.24
In addition, there seems no reason to require testamentary
or inter vivos trusts to comply with the formalities of the Stat-
19. Gordon v. Portland Trust Bank, 201 Ore. 648, 271 P.2d 653
(1954) (dictum).
20. Ibid.
21. E.g., Jackman v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 145 F.2d 945 (3d
Cir. 1944); Sigal v. Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 119 Conn. 570, 177
Atl. 742 (1935); In re Soper's Estate, 196 Minn. 60, 264 N.W. 427 (1935);
Gordon v. Portland Trust Bank, 201 Ore. 648, 271 P.2d 653 (1954). See
5 CoucH, INsURANcE § 29:48 (2d ed. 1960).
22. Frost v. Frost, 202 Mass. 100, 88 N.E. 446 (1909).
23. 1 Scort, TRUSTS § 57.3 (2d ed. 1956).
It is arguable that the [inter vivos] trust does not arise until the
death of the insured, that his death is a condition precedent to
the creation of the trust, and that therefore the disposition is
testamentary .... It is true that until the death of the insured
it is a pretty thin trust, and it would not be difficult to hold that
the disposition is testamentary. The difficulty in upholding the
trust, however, seems to be no greater than in upholding the
rights of the beneficiary of an insurance policy . . . where the
insured reserves power to change the beneficiary.
Id. at 458. (Emphasis added.)
24. See notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text.
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ute of Wills.25 Little danger of fraud exists. 26 The writing of
the insurance contract satisfies one requirement of the usual
Statute of Wills. The insurance contract and the trust agree-
ment serve an evidentiary purpose, insuring adequate protection
to the settlor-insured that his intent will be fulfilled with as
much certainty as the will. Furthermore, the requirement that
the settlor-insured set up a trust agreement and sign the insur-
ance contract, as well as filling in the beneficiary, serves a cau-
tionary purpose in preventing him from acting in a casual man-
ner. Finally, the testamentary life insurance trust conforms at
least in part to the formalities of the Statute of Wills since the
designation of the trustee, and sometimes the terms of the
trust, are established by the will of the insured.
B. THE PRESENT TRUST OBJECTION
The second objection to the testamentary life insurance trust
is that no present trust is created because of the dependence on
the will to provide the trustee and sometimes the trust terms
necessary to complete the trust. Again, it is helpful to refer to
the treatment accorded the inter vivos life insurance trust.
The objection of no present trust has also been made against the
inter vivos insurance trust, however, on the basis that no trust
property exists.2 7 The trust property requirement is met if the
beneficiary acquires any property interest during the lifetime of
the settlor, even though possession or enjoyment does not begin
until the settlor's death.28 Absent extensive reservation of rights
in the insurance contract, the beneifciary is considered to have
a vested interest in an irrevocable trust, which interest consti-
tutes sufficient trust property to satisfy the requirement.2 9
However, when extensive rights are reserved, it would seem that
the beneficiary has little more than an expectancy. The real
incidents of ownership are vested in the insured, and the bene-
ficiary's interest is merely contingent.
25. See Note, 46 HARV. L. REV. 818 (1933); 79 U. PA. L. REv. 237
(1930).
26. See generally 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 57.3 (2d ed. 1956); SMrrH, PE-
SONAL LIFE INSURANCE TRUSTS § 17, at 74 (1950).
27. The prerequisites for the creation of an express trust include
a subject matter on which the trust can operate, one competent to create
a trust, one capable of holding the property as trustee, and one for
whose benefit the trust property is held. Waesche v. Rizzuto, 224 Md.
573, 168 A.2d 871 (1961). See generally 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 26 (2d ed.
1956).
28. 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 56.5 (2d ed. 1956).
29. Central Bank v. HIume, 128 U.S. 195 (1888).
1124 [Vol. 51:1118
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The courts have avoided this argument in several ways.
Some courts have labeled the beneficiary's interest as vested
subject to divestment. 30 Courts which have conceded that the
beneficiary takes a mere expectancy have held without explana-
tion that a life insurance policy is sufficient res to validate an
inter vivos trust.31 Other courts have held that the beneficiary
has more than a mere expectancy, but fail to specify the na-
ture of that interest.32 In Kerr v. Crane,33 while admitting "the
beneficiary had no other interest than a mere expectancy de-
pendent upon the will and pleasure of the insured member,"34
the court stated that this did not necessarily prohibit the bene-
ficiary from dealing with this expectancy and enforcing it in
equity upon the death of insured when it became vested. Under
similar circumstances, the court in Hirsch v. Auer3 5 referred to
the beneficiary's interest in insurance policies as contingent
while commenting that this fact was of no importance because
the interest vests at the death of insured.
This stretching of trust principles in the inter vivos life in-
surance trust situation to uphold the sufficiency of the bene-
ficiary's interest in the proceeds of insurance policies indicates
a desire and purpose to give effect to the intent of the settlor-
insured. Conceptual rationalizations are accepted despite their
tenuous nature. Arguably, however, the peculiar nature of life
insurance requires a stretching of trust principles, as the inter-
est of the beneficiary is very slight.36 Some states recognize
30. Roberts v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 143 Ga. 780, 85
S.E. 1043 (1915); Indiana Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 180 Ind. 9,
101 N.E. 289 (1913).
31. Gurnett v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 356 Ill. 612, 191 N.E. 250 (1934);
State ex rel. Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Superior Court, 236 Ind. 135, 138 N.E.
2d 900 (1956); In re Kyte's Will, 174 Misc. 1094, 22 N.Y.S.2d 236 (1940).
32. Fahrney v. Wilson, 180 Cal. App. 2d 694, 4 Cal. Rptr. 670 (1960).
33. 212 Mass. 224, 98 N.E. 783 (1912).
34. Id. at 227-28, 98 N.E. at 784.
35. 146 N.Y. 13, 40 N.E. 397 (1895). See also Gordon v. Portland
Trust Bank, 201 Ore. 648, 271 P.2d 653 (1954), which promulgated a new
theory retaining a logical approach to the requirement of trust prop-
erty:
Our own view is that the ownership of the modern policy is
actually divided between the beneficiary and the insured. The
various marketing or sales features, such as the loan and cash
surrender values, are clearly the property of the insured. On
the other hand, the beneficiary is the owner of a promise to pay
the proceeds at the death of insured, subject to insured's right
of revocation .... The insured's rights are secondary and have
nothing to do with the basic purpose of life insurance.
Id. at 655-56, 271 P.2d at 656.
36. In case of an anticipatory breach by insurer, the insured, not
the beneficiary, has a cause of action. Yet when a judgment creditor
1967] 1125
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this lack of interest by validating the inter vivos life insurance
trust by statute.37 The attitude of the courts toward the inter
vivos life insurance trust may be urged in support of the validity
of the testamentary life insurance trust. Two points should be
carried over to the testamentary trust situation: (1) that the
courts have the tendency to ignore the technicalities of trust
principles when life insurance is involved; and (2) that the set-
tlor-insured's intent is accorded high respect.
Notwithstanding the favorable treatment accorded the in-
ter vivos insurance trust,3 8 when the trust is dependent on the
will of the insured for completion, the law is unclear as to its
validity. An insurance trust dependent on an instrument other
than a will for satisfaction of the requirements of a present trust
is clearly valid. In Kendrick v. Ray,3 9 a life insurance policy was
payable to a certain person as trustee, but neither the beneficiary
nor the terms of the trust were expressed. After the death of
insured, a sealed letter was found requesting payment of the
insurance proceeds to named persons. The court held the insur-
ance proceeds were payable to the trustee subject to the direc-
tions of the letter, commenting that it made no difference that
the letter and policy remained in insured's possession until
death.40  Furthermore, inability to identify the beneficiary ex-
cept by reference to a testamentary instrument does not neces-
sarily make the trust testamentary in character requiring execu-
tion in conformance with the Statute of Wills41 since the trust
of insured seeks to attach the interest in the policy, the courts favor the
beneficiary and will not insist on the exercise of the right to change
beneficiary in favor of the creditor. VANCE, INSURANCE § 108 (3d ed.
1951).
37. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-19-1 (1963); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 48.18.450 (Supp. 1965).
38. Even without the assistance of legislation, inter vivos insurance
trusts generally are held valid. 1 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 57,
comment f (1959).
If a person takes out a policy of insurance upon his life payable
to a third person as trustee, the trust is not testamentary al-
though the insured person reserves power to change the bene-
ficiary of the policy and power to revoke or modify the trust.
In such a case a present trust is created, the beneficiary of the
policy holding his rights as beneficiary in trust....
Id. at 154.
39. 173 Mass. 305, 53 N.E. 825 (1899).
40. Frost v. Frost, 202 Mass. 100, 88 N.E. 446 (1909), distinguishing
this case rather than overruling it, declares the invalidity of a testa-
mentary insurance trust: "There the trustee was the beneficiary named
in the policy; and the question was as to the terms of the oral trust
upon which he received the insurance, and not as to the validity of
the appointment of the trustee." Id. at 103, 88 N.E. at 448.
41. 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 56.4 (2d ed. :956); SMITh, PERsoNAL LiFE IN-
SURANCE TRUSTS § 19, at 86-87 (1950).
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requirement of a presently ascertainable beneficiary is satis-
fied.
42
The cases allowing reference to the will to complete an in-
surance trust often emphasize the intention of the insured and
ignore any contention that the trust is testamentary. For ex-
ample, in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Gatewood,43 the insured desig-
nated in the insurance contracts that the proceeds go to a spe-
cific bank as trustee of his estate. The insured also left a will
in which his residuary estate was left to the same bank as trustee
to be administered according to the trust set forth in the will.
The court held that the designation in the insurance policies of
the bank as trustee, rather than as executor, indicated that in-
sured intended the bank to take the proceeds of the policies as
trustee and to hold them in trust according to the terms set
forth in the will, without making the estate the beneficiary of
the policies. 44 Clearly the insured's intent was the primary con-
cern of the court.45
42. In Douglas's Estate, 303 Pa. 227, 154 Atl. 376 (1931), the trust
instrument referred to "her last will and testament bearing date the
Thirtieth day of August, 1918, witnessed by .... ." Accord, Hammett v.
Farrar, 29 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930). These cases restrict the
debate over the validity of the testamentary life insurance trust to the
case where no specific will is referred to for the completion of the trust.
In the Douglas case, the will dated August 30, 1918, was eventually pro-
bated as the decedent's last will and testament. However, a conceptually
difficult problem might have arisen if decedent had executed another
will. The question would have been whether the trust was valid by
the old will, or invalid because the new will revoked the old.
43. 317 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. 1958).
44. The court distinguished Prudential Ins. Co. v. Bloomfield Trust
Co., 104 N.J. Eq. 372, 145 Atl. 735 (1929), discussed at note 55 infra and
accompanying text, on the basis that designating in the insurance con-
tracts that the proceeds go to the bank as "trustee of estate of John J.
Gatewood" so correlated the trust to the will as to allow reference to
the trust created in the will for determination of the powers and duties
of the bank as trustee of the proceeds of the policies.
45. This contention and the Gatewood holding are supported in
St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Blue, 353 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. 1962); Ramsey
v. City of Brookfield, 361 Mo. 857, 237 S.W.2d 143 (1951). Although
the court in Blue reached a decision contrary to Gatewood, the court
stated:
Without detracting from these decisions and in full concur-
rence with the principle that an express trust will be found
and declared upon proper facts when necessary to effectuate
the intention of the party disposing of property and to prevent
the thwarting of his objectives and purposes, we find ....
St. Louis Trust Co. v. Blue, supra at 778.
In Gatewood, the appellant argued unsuccessfully that the bene-
ficiary designation in the insurance contracts, along with the statement
in the will naming the same bank as executor and trustee under a testa-
mentary trust, indicated that decedent intended the proceeds of the in-
surance policies to be a part of his estate.
19671 1127
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In Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Commissioner,46 the
insured made the policy payable to a trust company without
specifying the objects or terms of the trust. With no specific
reference to the policy, the will disposed of the residue of the
estate in trust, naming the same trust company as trustee of the
testamentary trust. The court held that the insurance proceeds
were subject to the provisions of the testamentary insurance trust
without passing through the estate. The decision was based on
the clear intent of the insured "as though the policies had
stated that they were payable to the Boston Safe Deposit & Trust
Company, trustee, under the trust set up in the will .. .
The court, as in Gatewood, ignored any question as to the testa-
mentary character of the insurance disposition.48
While these cases are not directly in point with the testa-
mentary insurance trust in which the trustee is specifically
named in insured's will, they suggest that such a trust should be
upheld to effectuate the intent of insured. This seems to be a
reasonable rationale for validating a trust dependent on an in-
sured's will, at least in the case of the testamentary insurance
trust where the insured's intent is very clear. If the settlor-
insured wants the insurance proceeds paid to his estate, he can
designate the beneficiary in the capacity of executor rather than
trustee.
However, case authority is not unanimous in allowing ref-
erence to the will to complete a trust. In Pavy v. Peoples Bank
& Trust Co.,49 the insured designated the bank as trustee-bene-
ficiary without naming the beneficiary or terms of the trust.
The trial court found that the following items created a trust
and effected the designation of beneficiaries: (1) the change of
beneficiary of the life insurance policy to the bank "to be held
in trust by;" (2) the will, which was executed three days later
naming the same bank as testamentary trustee of testator's re-
siduary estate; and (3) a suicide note found at the time of in-
46. 100 F.2d 266 (1st Cir. 1938).
47. Id. at 267.
48. See also Union Trust Co. v. McCaughn, 24 F.2d 459 (1927), in
which the proceeds of life insurance policies were made payable to
insured's wife as trustee without naming a beneficiary. The will, with-
out mentioning the trust, gave half the proceeds of the insurance to the
wife. The court held that the half of the proceeds not disposed of by
will was part of the gross estate because of failure of the trust, and that
the wife of decedent took no beneficial interest therein; but as to the
other half, the clause in the will operated as a declaration of the trust
and upon the death of insured the trust was complete.
49. 135 Ind. App. 647, 195 N.E.2d 862 (1964).
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sured's death which stated that the bank would have control of
all property and insurance proceeds for the family. However,
the appellate court reversed, holding that the trust failed and
the policy proceeds were a part of the residuary estate.50 In
justification, the court stated that the changing of the beneficiary
in the insurance policy failed to meet the formal requirements
of a valid trust demanded by law.rl
This decision, however, is not necessarily contrary to the
completion of a trust by reference to the will of insured. The
appellate court may have only disagreed with the lower court's
opinion that the testator intended the insurance trust be com-
pleted by reference to the will or note. Thus, it is unclear
whether this court would hold a trust invalid for failure to have
the necessary elements of a trust if specific reference to in-
sured's last will were required to complete the trust.
In Bickers v. Shenandoah Valley Nat'l Bank,52 there was no
question as to whether insured intended to relate an insurance
trust to his will. The insurance trust specifically provided for
dependence upon insured's will to determine the disposition of
the insurance proceeds. The life insurance policies had been de-
posited with the trustee and the proceeds were to be divided into
certain shares, the respective size contingent on whether the
widow accepted or renounced the will of insured. The court
held the trust testamentary in character and invalid because no
interest passed at the creation of the trust.53 Although agreeing
50. The significance of the proceeds passing to the estate was that
the creditors who claimed over $50,000 against an estate of less than
$1,000 without the insurance proceeds, would receive a larger pro rata
share on their credit to insured. Although the court does not mention
the creditors' claims as a factor in its decision, it may have been swayed
by this.
51. The appellate court suggested that the essential elements that
must exist to satisfy the law were the purpose of the trust, the subject
matter, the objects or beneficiaries, and the manner in which the trust's
assets are to be disposed.
52. 197 Va. 145, 88 S.E.2d 889 (1955).
53. Three justices dissented from the holding. Id. at 157, 88 S.E.2d
at 897. While conceding that the sole issue was whether the trust agree-
ment was testamentary in character and therefore invalid because of
its failure to comply with the Statute of Wills, the dissent, as stated by
Justice Whittle, emphasized the peculiar character of life insurance:
"[A]t the outset it must be remembered that we are here dealing with
a life insurance trust as distinguished from trusts involving other classes
of property." Id. at 158, 88 S.E.2d at 898.
The dissent further objected to the majority statement that the
settlor did not intend the insurance trust agreement to become effective
until after his death, claiming "the insurance trust creates definite, con-
tingent limitations in favor of the widow and the four daughters of the
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that "the alleged inter vivos trust agreement between the settlor
and the trustee must be construed according to its intent ... .
the court stated that dependence on the will was evidence of a
lack of intent to pass a present interest. In support, the court
maintained that the addendum to the trust agreement, which
declared the duty of the trustee during the life of settlor was
merely to hold the policies, was unequivocal language indicating
that no present interest passed.54
In Prudential Ins. Co. v. Bloomfield Trust Co.,55 insured
designated the trust company as trustee-beneficiary of his life
insurance proceeds without naming beneficiaries of the trust.
Later, insured executed a will giving the residue of his estate
in trust to his wife and children. The will did not mention the
life insurance proceeds. The court refused to allow reference
to the will to complete the life insurance trust stating that the
two documents had neither common purpose nor common sub-
ject. Although this decision may be interpreted as hostile
toward reference to the insured's will to complete a trust, it may
also be interpreted as being based upon a lack of intent to refer
to the will.56 The latter interpretation, of course, is not con-
settlor, subject to conditions precedent, which contingent limitations are
present interests passing prior to Bickers' death .... " Id. at 165, 88
S.E.2d at 902.
54. The dissent's answer to this contention was that the trust provi-
sions restricting the trustee during insuxed's lifetime "merely preserve
rights that are inherent in life insurance policies." Id. at 167, 88 S.E.2d
at 902.
Two reasons have been suggested for the result in this case: the
Virginia court has a strong aversion to will substitutes; and is quick to
condenm revocable transfers as a fraud on the wife's interest. Note, 42
VA. L. REV. 256, 286 (1956).
55. 104 N.J. Eq. 372, 145 Atl. 735 (1929). The decision in this case
may be biased by the fact that the assets of the estate were not suffi-
cient to cover the debts of insured. However, the case could be justified
on the basis of lack of intent to correlate the trust and the will. The
court seems unconcerned with the testamentary character of depend-
ence of the insurance trust on the will and appears equally unconcerned
with the formal requirements required to create a valid trust.
56. On similar facts, Bellinger v. Bellinger, 180 Misc. 948, 46 N.Y.S.
2d 263 (Sup. Ct. 1943), indicated some concern with intent of insured
while, at the same time, displaying a hostile attitude towards dependence
of a trust upon a will:
But assuming arguendo that an insurance contract can be so
framed as to provide that the proceeds thereof shall be dis-
posed of in such manner as the insured shall direct in his last
will, clear language would be required to produce that result,
and no language indicative of such intent is to be found in this
case ....
Id. at 951, 46 N.Y.S.2d at 266.
Thus, the mere fact insured created a trust by will is insufficient
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trary to the testamentary life insurance trust situation where
specific reference is made to the will of insured.
In summarizing the case authority on testamentary life in-
surance trusts, two approaches to the problem are apparent.
On the one hand are those cases denying the validity of such
a vehicle, relying upon the testamentary and present trust ob-
jections expressed in the Frost case. On the other are those
cases upholding such a trust, relying for the most part on the
intent of the insured.
The arguments advanced in the Frost case reveal their own
weaknesses. The court emphasized the testamentary objection,
but this question is more easily answered by prior case author-
ity recognizing the inherently testamentary nature of life insur-
ance. The stronger argument, that there is no present designa-
tion of a trustee, an essential element for a valid trust, is weak-
ened by the following statement of the Frost court:
While it is true ... that the trustees when finally ascer-
tained would derive their appointment under the assignment
and not under the will, still it remains equally true that
they could not be appointed nor even ascertained until after
the death of the assignor. 57
The court suggests by this statement that the ascertainment of
a trustee after the death of insured relates back to the for-
mation of the trust rather than to the will. Consequently, the
trust originally incomplete without a definite trustee would now
be valid.
Unfortunately, those cases upholding the testamentary life
insurance trust do not counter effectively the two objections
raised by Frost. One possible explanation is that the courts,
while recognizing the testamentary nature of the trust, consider
it more important to give effect to insured's intent. This ex-
planation follows from the recognition that insurance is by na-
ture testamentary58 and creates no danger of fraud.59 Another
approach to the testamentary attack of Frost is the argument
that the testamentary insurance trust is not the equivalent of a
will. Support for this argument may be derived from the con-
tractual nature of life insurance. A third explanation may be
that the testamentary question is irrelevant because a valid
trust has been created. Union Trust Co. v. McCaughn,6 indi-
to support an intent to apply this trust to an insurance trust in order
to satisfy the formal requirements of a valid trust.
57. 202 Mass. 100, 102, 88 N.E. 446, 447 (1909).
58. See note 11 supra.
59. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
60. 24 F.2d 459 (E.D. Pa. 1927).
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cates a conceptual way to satisfy the formal requirements for a
valid trust:
In considering the effect of the trust finally effectuated by the
will, it cannot be said that the contract of insurance is one
thing, and the manner of procee& entirely a separate thing,
and that the trust related only to the proceeds, and therefore
did not come into existence until the testator's death. Under a
contract of insurance, the rights of the beneficiary do not
arise from the death of the insured.... [T]he provision in
the will by which the trust was completed related back to the
time when the policy was taken out.61
This relation back doctrine62 may be considered logically correct,
but still a rather thin rationalization. However, this doctrine is
not the first thin conceptual rationalization of a present trust.
As discussed previously, the inter vivos insurance trust is held
valid despite attacks that life insurance is not sufficient prop-
erty to be the subject of a trust.6' Furthermore, the relation
back doctrine is consistent with the liberal view that no particu-
lar formalities are necessary for the creation of a valid trust; all
that is necessary is evidence supplying every essential require-
ment of a trust. 4
III. STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION
Several states have enacted statutes expressly authorizing
the use of the testamentary life insurance trust to avoid pro-
bate.65 Such legislation avoids the confusion and uncertainty of
the current case authority, and provides full deference to the
insured's intent.
Of those statutes allowing completion of a life insurance
trust by reference to the will of the insured, the Wisconsin stat-
ute is typical.66
A policy of life insurance may designate as beneficiary a
61. Id. at 462.
62. The Frost case appears to recognize the validity of the relation
back doctrine, but ignores it in making a decision holding the trust
invalid. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
63. See notes 32-38 supra and accompanying text.
64. See Union Trust Co. v. McCaughn, 24 F.2d 459 (E.D. Pa. 1927);
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Gatewood, 317 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. 1958).
65. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-19-1 (1965); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 38-158 (Supp. 1965); MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 350C (1964); N.Y.
DECED. EST. § 47-f (Supp. 1966); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.64 (Page
1966); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.7a (Supp. 1966); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 48.18.452 (Supp. 1966); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44-5-11 (1966); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 231.49(1) (Supp. 1967).
66. Compare MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 350C (1964); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 20, § 301.7a (Supp. 1966). These statutes illustrate different wording,
resulting in the same effect as the Wisconsin statute.
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trustee or trustees named or to be named by will, if the
designation is made in accordance with the provisions of the
policy and the requirements of the insurance company. The
trustee or trustees may be appointed immediately after the
proving of the will, and upon appointment and qualification
the proceeds of such insurance shall be paid to the trustee or
trustees to be held and disposed of under the terms of the will
as they exist at the death of the testator .... The proceeds
of the insurance as collected by the trustee or trustees shall
not be subject to debts of the insured and inheritance tax to
any greater extent than if such proceeds were payable to any
other named beneficiary other than the estate of the in-
sured. 67  For purposes of trust administration such pro-
ceeds shall be subject to the court jurisdiction over the trust
* * * but shall not otherwise be considered as payable to the
estate of the insured .... Such insurance proceeds so held
in trust may be commingled with any other assets which
may properly come into such trust as provided in the
Will .... 6s
The effect of these statutes is to provide assurance of the
validity of a testamentary life insurance trust whereby insured
designates a trustee to be named in his will as beneficiary of his
life insurance contract. Under such legislation, the trustee
named in the will of the insured as beneficiary of the insurance
proceeds may administer such proceeds as part of a testamentary
trust established in the will for the assets of the estate. No spe-
cial insurance trust need be drafted since any testamentary
trust can receive the proceeds. Thus the insured has an uncom-
67. This clause adopts the law of the individual state as to inherit-
ance tax on ordinary insurance policies. Under Colorado law, for ex-
ample, the first $75,000 of insurance proceeds payable to a named bene-
ficiary other than the estate of insured would be exempt from taxation.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 138-3-9 (1963). In Minnesota, the clause would
have little tax significance since insurance proceeds in which insured
has retained incidents of ownership are taxable without an exemption.
MnIm. STAT. § 291.01(5) (Supp. 1965). The clause is flexible enough
to handle the particular state law and also to follow any change in the
state law without amendment.
Under the federal estate tax, the tax considerations of a testamentary
insurance trust are neutral. The proceeds of insurance policies, in trust
or not, will be includible in the insured's gross estate and consequently
subject to taxation, if the proceeds are payable to insured's estate or if
insured retains any incidents of ownership. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §
2042. For a more detailed discussion of the taxation of insurance trusts
see Huff, Life Insurance Trusts for Everyman, 39 COLO. L. REV. 239, -253-
57 (1967).
68. Wis. STAT. A~x. § 231.49(1) (Supp. 1966). The provision for
a testamentary insurance trust is not a completely new idea. The change
in section number illustrates the dichotomy of the testamentary insur-
ance trust which relates to both trust and insurance law. See generally,
Note, 1956 Wis. L. REv. 313. The Wisconsin statute was originally
enacted in 1955 as § 206.52 under the "Insurance" title, but was changed
in 1963 to § 231.49 under the title of "Uses and Trusts."
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plicated, flexible, and inexpensive method of disposing of in-
surance proceeds in trust.
IV. THE RIGHTS OF SPOUSE AND CREDITORS
Even if it is conceded that the testamentary life insurance
trust provides the insured with an uncomplicated and flexible
method of disposing of insurance proceeds, notice must be taken
of the possible conflicting public policies of the protection of the
wife69 and creditors.70 Strong objection has been made to the
testamentary life insurance trust and to legislation authorizing
its use upon these policy grounds.7' The critics argue that while
the will substitute may be conceptually distinguishable from a
testamentary disposition, an extension of will substitutes to the
detriment of the widow or creditors is undesirable. The Wis-
consin statute clearly puts creditors in the same position as they
have been under the usual life insurance contract. However,
case authority indicates that creditors may reach the proceeds of
an insurance trust when the trustee is to be named by will. In
In re Kenin's Trust Estate,72 insured executed a will leaving his
residuary estate in trust for his wife and his descendants. On
the same day, he executed a trust deed by which life insurance
policies were put in trust with directions to a named trustee to
collect the proceeds on his death and to pay them over to trustees
to be named in his will, to be held by them in accordance with
the disposition of the residuary estate.73 The court held that the
69. See generally McDoNALD, FRAuD ON =H WImow's SHARE (1960).
70. See generally Riesenfeld, Life Insurance and Creditors' Reme-
dies in the United States, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 583 (1957).
71. Haskell, Testamentary Trustee as Insurance Beneficiary: An
Estate Planning Gimmick, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 566 (1966).
72. 343 Pa. 549, 23 A.2d 837 (1942); see In re Estate of Rothen-
buecher, 76 Ohio App. 425, 64 N.E.2d 680 (1945); In re Myers' Estate,
309 Pa. 581, 164 Atl. 611 (1933).
73. The Frost case suggests that under this fact situation the testa-
mentary life insurance would be valid:
There is nothing to indicate that he intended to make any de-
livery to any third person to hold for the trustees until they
were finally ascertained, nor is it shown upon the facts in the
case that he intended to hold the policies himself as trustee.
Frost v. Frost, 202 Mass. 100, 102, 88 N.E. 446, 447 (1909). See notes 5-6
supra and accompanying text. If a court is to hold the testamentary
life -insurance trust invalid, the Kenin rationale seems more desirable.
Under the Frost rationale, the mere technicality of naming oneself as
trustee to pay the insurance proceeds to a trustee to be named is suffi-
cient to accomplish the results denied under a testamentary life insur-
ance trust-the passing of insurance prcceeds according to provisions of
the will by the trustees named therein, without being part of the assets
of the estate.
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disposition of the proceeds was testamentary, and that such pro-
ceeds were not exempt from claims of creditors, since they be-
came assets of the estate on failure of the transfer to the trust.
Although the Kenin case has been overruled by legisla-
tion in Pennsylvania,' 4 it does illustrate what courts may do in
the absence of similar legislation. Protection of creditors ad-
mittedly is desirable; however, public policy also favors the ex-
emption of life insurance proceeds from such claims.75 Appar-
ently all states exempt life insurance proceeds from the claims of
creditors, at least in some degree.7 6 Such statutes are appropri-
ate in that insured receives little personal benefit from the poli-
cies77 other than the assurance a beneficiary will be paid at his
death. If creditors are to be protected, a point of division at
the testamentary insurance trust seems quite arbitrary. There is
little difference between life insurance payable to a designated
person or trustee and a testamentary trustee, at least from the
creditor's standpoint. To allow creditors rights in the insurance
proceeds of a testamentary insurance trust would merely dis-
courage use of such a trust with a consequent disposition by the
ordinary means of life insurance beneficiary designation. Be-
sides, the creditor is protected to a certain extent in some states
by statutory limits on the amount of protection s and the class
of beneficiary.70 In other states no limits are set, but the
creditor is protected against fraud.80 The Wisconsin statute gives
the same protection to testamentary insurance trusts accorded
the ordinary insurance contract. Thus the statute merely as-
74. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.7a (Supp. 1966).
75. 5 COUCH, INSURANCE § 29:118 (2d ed. 1960); VANCE, INSURANCE
§ 124 (3d ed. 1951). These authorities suggest that the purpose of the
exemption is to benefit the beneficiary, rather than the insured. The
exemption seems to be based, at least originally, on the desire to pro-
tect the wife and children.
76. 5 COUCH, INSURANCE § 29:119 (2d ed. 1960); VANCE, INSURANCE
§ 124 (3d ed. 1951).
77. The testamentary insurance trust can be distinguished from
the savings bank trust (Totten trust), where creditors can reach the
trust corpus during the life of the settlor and after death: The settlor
of the insurance trust can have no present benefit -whereas the settlor
of the Totten trust may revoke the trust at will and enjoy the corpus
of the trust. See In re Campell's Estate, 140 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Surr. Ct.
1955).
78. E.g., S.D. CODE §§ 31-1509, 51-1805 (Supp. 1960).
79. E.g., M. ANN. CODE art. 58A, § 385 (1964).
80. E.g., MuNN. STAT. § 61.14 (1957):
All premiums paid for insurance in fraud of creditors, with
interest thereon, shall inure to their benefit from the proceeds
of the policy, if the company be specifically notified thereof,
in writing before payment.
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sures that the method of disposition of insurance proceeds will
not mean a difference in immunity from creditors.
The Wisconsin statute does not refer to the widow's rights
in the estate. The purpose of such legislation leads to the con-
clusion that the testamentary insurance trust is exempt from
the widow's rights in the same manner as the ordinary insurance
contract. Generally, life insurance payable to a designated bene-
ficiary other than the spouse has been upheld against the wid-
ow's claims."' As in the case of creditors' claims, the Wisconsin
statute is not designed to take away any rights the wife already
has. The objection to allowing the imposition of the wife's claims
is that it would distinguish between the life insurance contract
or inter vivos trust and the testamentary insurance trust. Thus,
if a state wishes to make life insurance subject to the wife's
claims, the proposed legislation for testamentary insurance
trusts would not have to be changed. Such a statute provides
only for identity of treatment of all life insurance. Moreover,
the wife is not defenseless against life insurance, in trust or
otherwise. Some jurisdictions, in application of the forced share
statute to the nontestamentary disposition of property, inquire
whether the transfer was "illusory";82 other jurisdictions inquire
whether there was intent to defraud;8 3 still another jurisdiction
considers various factors such as intent to disinherit, retention of
control, and other means of support for the wife.8 4 Where these
defenses have failed, the legislatures have passed statutes pro-
tecting the wife.8 5 A Pennsylvania statute" allows the wife to
treat an inter vivos conveyance of assets as a testamentary dis-
position, but specifically exempts the privilege as to life insur-
ance, whether payable in trust or otherwise. This specific ex-
emption emphasizes the distinctive and peculiar characteristics
of life insurance.
V. CONCLUSION
Legislation validating the testamentary life insurance trust
is desirable to clarify the law in states where the issue as to the
81. E.g., In re Henderson's Estate, 395 Pa. 215, 149 A.2d 892 (1959);
see Bullen v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 177 Md. 271, 9 A.2d 581 (1939);
5 COUCH, INSURANCE § 29:1 (2d ed. 1960).
82. E.g., National Shawmut Bank v. Cumming, 325 Mass. 457, 91
N.E.2d 337 (1950); Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
83. E.g., Wanstrath v. Kappel, 356 'Mo. 210, 201 S.W.2d 327 (1947).
84. E.g., Whittington v. Whittington, 205 Md. 1, 106 A.2d 72 (1954).
85. N.Y. DEcED. EST. § 18-a (Supp. 1966); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §
301.11 (Supp. 1966).
86. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.11 (Supp. 1966).
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validity of such a trust has never been decided. Such legislation
should, like the Wisconsin statute, provide for the specific vali-
dation of the testamentary life insurance trust, for the treatment
of the trust in the same manner as the ordinary life insurance
contract with respect to the debts of insured and inheritance tax,
and for the commingling of the insurance proceeds and other
trust assets as provided for in the will. The Wisconsin legislation
does not specifically provide for the assertion of the spouse's
forced share. However, in keeping with the spirit of effectuating
insured's intent and of not distinguishing between ordinary life
insurance and life insurance in trust, a provision should be
added to give the same treatment to the insurance trust as to
the insurance contract with respect to the spouse's forced share.
In most states such a provision would bar the spouse from assert-
ing a claim against insurance proceeds within a testamentary
life insurance trust.
Such legislation is desirable in that it will give effect to
the intent of insured without adversely affecting creditors' or
wife's claims to any greater extent than under the ordinary in-
surance contract. The legislation will provide a simple and flex-
ible way for insured to dispose of his insurance proceeds through
a unified estate plan. The prospective insured need only check
with his insurance agent to be certain the insurance company
will allow the designation as beneficiary of the insurance
policy, "trustee to be named in my last will and testament."
Assuming the agreement of the insurance company, insured will
merely make the designation. A will completing the trust and
providing for disposition of the proceeds under a testamentary
trust for the probate assets set up in the will can then be drawn
up. If insured is uncertain as to the identity of the trustee or
the beneficiary of the trust, he may wait to execute a will.
Meanwhile, if he dies the insurance proceeds will pass as part of
his probate estate, the trust failing for lack of a definite trustee.
While objections have been made to the validity of the testa-
mentary insurance trust, such authority has failed to consider the
peculiar nature of life insurance. The insurance contract, often
subject to debate, has been clearly held to be nontestamentary,
although life insurance by its very nature may operate only at
death. Even though courts have found it hard to justify the
inter vivos insurance trust conceptually, it has generally been
upheld, sometimes without facing these conceptual difficulties.
Although the testamentary insurance trust can be explained as a
valid trust by using the relation back doctrine, such rationaliza-
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tion is unnecessary in light of the interpretion of a life insurance
contract as nontestamentary and the life insurance trust as a
valid trust. Consequently, legislation validating the testamen-
tary insurance trust is consistent with earlier developments of
the insurance concept.
